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,:hroughout the history of professional sports, labor

resolving labor disputes arising under the collective bargaining
disputes have been a major source of contention causing agreement. I Consequently, arbitration isthe primary forum
disorder and strife within every professional sports league.' for resolving disputes between the players and the owners
Arbitration2 is the current form of dispute resolution, concerning salaries. ' The major professional sports leagues
designed and implemented by the professional sports leagues' in the United States all employ arbitration to resolve salary
"collective bargaining agreements "' 3 to cope with increasing disputes; however, MLB has initiated a unique, and possibly
labor conflicts in the professional sports industry.4 A primary superior, form of arbitration called "final offer arbitration"
reason for the development of the collective bargaining (hereinafter FOA). 3
agreement and arbitration to resolve labor conflicts was the
Initially,this paper will briefly consider arbitration in
escalation of strikes and lockouts arising out of labor general and then discuss the evolution of FOA and its
disputes.5 The result of such unresolved labor conflicts is implementation into MLB salary disputes. This paper will
the loss of millions of dollars by both the owners and the thereafter analyze the praises and criticisms of FOA, and
players of professional baseball teams.6 Major League Baseball establish that FOA is a superior mechanism for resolving
(hereinafter MLB), for example, has encountered more labor- salary disputes in professional sports because the FOA system
management disputes than any other professional sports is designed to facilitate negotiation and settlement rather
league.7 The extraordinary amount of labor disputes in MLB than to resolve the dispute subsequent to adversarial
can be attributed to MLB's collective bargaining agreement, hearings.
years of near total owner control of labor relations, and the
introduction of free agency.8 Arbitration provides an essential
and indispensable means by which professional sports leagues
can settle labor disputes expeditiously and economically
without either side resorting to strikes or lockouts."
Arbitration is a form of adjudication where the
In the early 1960s, arbitration entered the
professional sports arena as the preferred method for parties agree on a neutral decision maker who is neither a
resolving labor disputes.'0 Since its introduction into judge nor an official from an administrative agency. This
professional sports, arbitration has been incorporated into decision-maker then renders a binding judgment on their
almost all collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, dispute. 4 No single definitive definition can perfectly describe
courts have regarded arbitration as the proper forum for the various forms of arbitration, as there are many variants
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to the process." Generally, arbitration is an alternative to Conversely, in interest arbitration, the arbitrator is given
litigation, where the parties, under contract or otherwise, the power to set the agreement terms to avoid strikes while
agree to arbitrate their dispute through 'non-judicial means." 6 resolving labor disputes over contract terms. 0
With few exceptions, arbitration hearings are not open to
Arbitration isused primarily in commercial and labor
the public. 7 When parties enter into an arbitration disputes via collective bargaining agreements in the areas of
agreement, they understand that the decision is binding injury, salary, discipline, and general disputes arising out of
the agreement terms.3 If the dispute is not one in the labor
and cannot be appealed. 8
Prior to an arbitration proceeding, parties enter into context, it isgenerally considered one of commercial origin.32
an agreement to arbitrate specific sources of contention. At In professional sports, both commercial and labor arbitration
this time, parties have significant latitude to design the are customary. Collective bargaining agreements in
procedures, substantive standards, and specifications of the professional sports provide for arbitration to settle
arbitration.' 9 The parties may also jointly select the neutral grievances, especially those concerning salary disputes.33
decision-maker. 0 As a
Historically, courts
result, numerous new
defer
to
the
systems of arbitration
arbitrator's ruling in the
labor context unless it
have developed.2 ' These
systems are tailored by
is clear that the parties
the parties to meet their
n fspecifically intended
own specific interests, and
not be
that the dispute
arbitrated. 4
t
often more closely
resemble
"mixed
Prior to 1984,
P
processes" rather than
courts held a strong
arbitration.2 2 Mixed
presumption against
processes
combine
arbitration in the
elements of the primary process, including negotiation, commercial context primarily because of state statutory
mediation, fact finding, or adjudication. Primary processes limitations on commercial arbitration." However, in 1984,
include court-annexed arbitration, summary jury trials, and the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act
mediation-arbitration. Each of these processes, whether governs both federal and state courts,"superceding conflicting
court annexed or privately conjured,'borrows' components state statutes "'36 The Supreme Court mandated that "any
from the various alternative dispute resolution processes doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
and applies them accordingly, in a more tailored fashion, to resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem is the
the specific needs of the dispute.
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
The two prevalent types of arbitration employed of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.. . ."7 A
today are"interest arbitration21 3 and "grievance arbitration.2 4 "strong federal policy favoring arbitration" over litigation
Interest arbitration sets the terms of a contract arising under remains in both the labor or commercial context when
a collective bargaining agreement.25 FOA isa type of interest contractual provisions provide for "arbitrability" of claims.38
arbitration, and in MLB, replaces the strike or lockout with
As a result, arbitration has become "the modus
the risk that a neutral third party will determine the operandi for maintaining stability and industrial peace"39 in
settlement.2 6 This risk can be a difference of millions of the professional sports industry. When an arbitrator rules
dollars. For example, Player X submits his estimate of what on a dispute arising out of a collective bargaining agreement
he believes he deserves as a salary, say $6 million per year, or implicating the National Labor Relations Act,4° courts will
and the Owner submits his number of $1.6 million per year. almost always honor the decision.4 If the four criteria
The risk lies in the fact that the arbitrator can only choose justifying arbitration are met, a court will not overturn an
the player's number or the owner's number and cannot arbitrator's ruling. These criteria are: (I) the grievance
negotiate a middle number. Both parties stand to lose huge proceeding must be fair; (2) the parties must have agreed to
amounts of money as oftentimes these are multiple year be bound by the arbitration decision; (3) the arbitrator's
contracts.
decision must be consistent with the NLRA and in no way
Grievance arbitration, 27 on the other hand, interprets contravene its purposes and policies; and (4) the issues
the terms of an agreement rather than setting those terms. 28 presented by the alleged unfair labor practice must have been
Grievance arbitration is most analogous to labor arbitration part of the case before the arbitrator.4 Arbitration in
in the private sector, excluding salary arbitration. However, professional sports has deterred strikes and lockouts by
in grievance arbitration, management seldom assigns the providing a viable, expedient and efficient resolution of
arbitrator the power to set the terms of an agreement.29 disputes between players and clubs. Following the Supreme
Instead, the arbitrator interprets the terms of the agreement. Court's support of the process, arbitration became the
___

preferred method resolving labor disputes in professional
sports.

FOA, as used by MLB, exemplifies how parties can
construct a unique process geared towards their specific
needs.4 3 Baseball's salary arbitration process surfaced, in part,
as a response to the unprecedented amount of labor disputes
within the MLB and the resulting turmoil. The extraordinary
amounts of disputes in MLB surfaced, primarily, in response
to the collective bargaining agreements, and predominantly
concerned players' salaries. Baseball arbitration can be traced
back to procedures used in negotiating labor management
disputes in unionized sectors.' The process of FOA was
originally introduced as a mechanism for resolving labor
4
disputes in the 1940s to circumvent the Taft-Hartley Act's
46
national emergency dispute procedures.

&oBeforeArbitraion Was a Part of

Major League Baseball
The excessive number of labor disputes in MLB, due
to the extreme power maintained by the owners over the
players' careers for most of this century, necessitated a
revamping of the leagues' labor dispute resolution practices.
Prior to the current arbitration method employed by MLB,
the owners used a'board of arbitration' to deal with league
policy concerns. 47 This board, however, was not impartial
'
because itwas an "instrument of baseball's management."48
MLB's owners had total power in determining what salary a
player would get once he signed with the team. 49 The advent
of the "reserve clause" was a reason for the owners' total
power, and was further augmented by MLB's antitrust
exemption. 0
The reserve clause gave owners "the option of
renewing a player's contract ad infinitum at a salary determined
by the owner."'" The reserve clause was implemented in
every baseball player's contract from the 1880s until the
1970s52 when it was finally discarded after years of litigation,
arbitration and collective bargaining.53 Prior to the
nullification of the reserve clause, players had only two
5 4
They
options if they did not agree with their contract.
could either continue to play for their current owner or
they could retire from the game altogether.55
The reserve clause was only the beginning of the
owners' monopolistic rule of MLB. 5' In FederalBaseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,17 the plaintiff, an opposing league to MLB, challenged
MLB's reserve clause. Plaintiff alleged that MLB "conspired
to monopolize the baseball business"5 8 because players could

not get out of their contracts, and thus, could not sign with
their league. 9 Finding in favor of the defendant, the Court
effectively exempted MLB from antitrust laws. 6° The Court
stated, "that which in its consummation is not commerce
does not become commerce among the States" simply
because the teams cross state lines for their exhibitions and
induce their players to do so. 6 ' Therefore,the charges "against
the defendants were not an interference with commerce
among the States."62 Consequently, MLB became the only
professional sports league in the United States to enjoy
antitrust exemption. 63 This ruling laid the foundation for the
future chaos erupting within MLB concerning player salary
disputes and the eventual strikes and lockouts faced by the
4
league.1
Two subsequent cases heard by the Supreme Court
regarding MLB's antitrust exemption reinforced that
exemption. In Toolson v. NewYork Yankees, Inc.,6 the Court
held that the decision to overturn MLB's antitrust exemption
rests in Congress' dominion. 6 In that case, plaintiff alleged
that MLB team owners violated antitrust laws. 6'7 Toolson
played for the NewYorkYankees. 68 He refused to report to
spring training, and subsequently, other league owners would
not sign him to their roster.'9 Toolson claimed that MLB
attempted to monopolize professional baseball and
maintained unjust restraints on players by way of the reserve
clause.70 In a per curium decision, the court stated that
"Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."'
In Flood v. Kuhn,72 the Supreme Court once again
upheld MLB's antitrust exemption. Flood challenged MLB's
anti-trust exemption after he was traded to the Philadelphia
Phillies by the St. Louis Cardinals. 73 He refused to play with
the Phillies that season, planning to sign with another team
following the end of the season. 4 The Court stated that
although professional baseball is indeed a business involved
in interstate commerce, it is in a "very distinct sense, an
exception and an anomaly." Therefore, MLB may enjoy an
exemption from antitrust laws. However, other professional
sports are not permitted to enjoy this same exemption.75
The Court's decision "rests on recognition and an acceptance
of baseball's unique characteristics and needs" and the lack
of action by Congress to overturn the exemption.7'
This antitrust exemption has been a major source
of contention in MLB, but neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has overturned the rulings of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc., Toolson or Flood.77 Consequently,"litigation
has proven to be an ineffective forum for players in their
attempt to equalize their bargaining position with the
owners." 7 The players had to find alternative methods to
achieve their goals. 79 Unionization, negotiation and collective
bargaining became the means by which players leveled the
bargaining field. 0 In search of means to overcome MLB's
antitrust exemption, the players' union appointed Marvin
Miller as president of the Major League Players'Association. 8'

Major League Baseball's Answer to Salary Disputes and the Strie
Marvin Miller then sought and acquired recognition of the
players' union's bargaining status by the National Labor
Relations Board in 1969.82 Finally, the players found equal
bargaining power and a means to effectuate change in MLB's
labor system. 3 The players achieved equal bargaining power
84
through labor laws when the antitrust laws failed them.
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In 1972, the players organized a strike which finally
owners' attention.85 As a result, in 1973, the
the
caught
players incorporated a salary arbitration clause in the 1973
Collective Bargaining Agreement. This clause stated that if
players and owners could not reach an agreement concerning
the player's salary, an outside arbitrator would resolve the
dispute.8 6 In 1975, the reserve clause was virtually nullified
during an arbitration hearing with Andy Messersmith, then
of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
Messersmith challenged MLB's reserve clause by way
of grievance arbitration. 87 Messersmith played out his renewal
contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Following the end
of the season, Messersmith sought to sign with another team
in the league. 8 Every team in the league refused to bid for
his services because they assumed that he 'belonged to the
Dodgers.'89 In reaction, Messersmith invoked the grievance
arbitration process agreed to in the collective bargaining
agreement, alleging that the renewal clause only renewed
his services for one additional year" The owners countered
that if a team renews a player's contract under the same
terms as the original contract, the original contract's renewal
terms are incorporated in the renewed contract.9' Thus,
the owners claimed that the contract conferred perpetual
rights of renewal to the team.9 2 The arbitrator ruled for
Messersmith, noting that the renewal clause only gave the
team the right to one additional year of service. 9'
Consequently, the ruling permitted any player who plays out
his renewal term to become a free agent. 4 The decision set
the stage for player free agency in MLB. 93 However, the
owners did not take this decision lightly and appealed the
judgment to the courts.9 6 A federal district court, supported
by a federal appeals court,
upheld the decision,
finding no wrongdoing on
the arbitrator's behalf.97
Following the

b
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p

agency, labor dispute

disorder in MLB became
the norm.98

Salaries

skyrocketed from an
average of $5 1,501 in
1975 to $76,066 in 1976
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and $371,157 in 1985. 9 Player strikes and/or lockouts
became a regular practice over the next couple of years."
The 1981 MLB season saw the first midseason strike, the
third in baseball's history, and cost the players, the owners,
the cities, and related businesses extraordinary amounts of
money.1"' However, the players finally became a force to be
reckoned with and collective bargaining became the tool by
which baseball's future would be shaped. 02
The launch of free agency and salary arbitration
resulted in new tensions between the players and owners.
Players attained substantial bargaining power and a veritable
means for resolving salary disputes. 3 Owners resented
the increase in players' salaries, blaming it on the
implementation of salary arbitration."4 Consequently, the
owners continuously undertake to abolish the clause, while
5
the players persistently refuse to negotiate it away."' The
1990 Basic Agreement was implemented by the league in
1990 after a thirty-two day spring training lockout that
resulted from contentious discussions regarding salary
arbitration eligibility issues and the possible salary cap. These
issues concerned whether players in their second year could
be eligible for salary arbitration. The player's sought eligibility
for salary arbitration for players in their second year of
employment. The owners desired to limit salary arbitration
only to players who have at least completed three years of
service in MLB. This agreement set player eligibility for salary
arbitration below the three year level, increased management
pension contributions, and raised the minimum salary to
$100,000.06
Yet the players went on strike again in 1994 after
tensions between the players and owners over controlling
salary negotiations and free agency peaked."' 7 The strike
culminated in the close of the season and the cancellation of
theWorld Series for the first time since 1904.108 In order to
abate the strike, on March 31, 1995,Judge Sonia Sotomayor
ordered an injunction forcing the owners to reinstate the
free agency/reserve systems and its salary arbitration
provisions of the 1990 Basic Agreement."' 9 Consequently,
since the origins of baseball arbitration, as exemplified by
the final outcome in 1995, the arbitration proceedings
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concerning salary disputes have been refined dramatically motivated by retaining his or her position, whereas, a three
and the integration of FOA has set MLB salary arbitration arbitrator panel with confidential voting would guarantee
apart from the rest of professional sports.' 'The purpose of impartial decisions unhampered by personal employment
MLB's salary arbitration process was to provide an alternative motives.'23 The arbitrators are seasoned in MLB salary
to strike and lockouts in the league.'
arbitration and labor grievance cases. 24 Once a player is
Final offer, or last-best offer,arbitration was designed eligible for salary arbitration, he may file for arbitration
to induce settlement between the parties as an alternative between January I and January 15.121 Subsequently, once
to strikes and lockouts." 2 First, the process requires that salary arbitration is invoked, the MLBPA and the PRC notify
the arbitrator choose either the player's proposal or the the arbitrators when they will be needed for the hearings. 26
owner's offer.' "There isno room for the arbitrator to choose The salary arbitrations are then held between February I
4
a number between the offers or compromise in any way."
and February 20. Arbitrators are paid a flat fee of $750 for
Great risk is therefore involved if the parties do not come each scheduled case.' 27 The costs are split between the player
to an agreement before the arbitrator awards a salary.'"
and the club.' 28 The arbitrators are not informed of which
29
Final offer arbitration encourages players and owners to player's case they will hear.
negotiate in good faith and compromise in order to avoid
MLB arbitration is "last best offer" or FOA. The
leaving the decision up to the arbitrator." 6 To meet those two sides each have one hour to state their position followed
ends, both players and owners in negotiating the collective by a thirty minute rebuttal period.'
The arbitrators
bargaining agreement determine the criteria to invoke salary announce their decision within twenty-four hours without
arbitration and what arbitrators may consider in rendering any written opinion.'3 ' The decision is binding and not open
a decision.
to appeal. The decisions are publicized throughout the season
rather than being announced simultaneously at the end of
C. Criteria and Procedures for
the season. 32 The arbitration process as a whole is not kept
Salary Arbitration in Major League
confidential; however,the contents of communications within
Baseball
the arbitration and the reason for the decision are not
Crucial components of salary arbitration provisions publicized because the arbitrators do not write an opinion.
in collective bargaining agreements relate to: who is eligible Confidentiality lends to a more communicative discussion
for salary arbitration, who the arbitrators are, how many of interests often assisting in the resolution process.
arbitrators preside over the hearing, and what criteria the
The collective bargaining agreement also catalogs
arbitrator may take into consideration when making his or what criteria may be considered by the arbitrators when
her determination." 7 Presently, in regard to salary arbitration, making a decision. ArticleVI, Section (F) (12) of Major League
the collective bargaining agreement permits all players with Baseball's Basic Agreement provides the criteria (alist of ten
three to six years of major league service to be eligible for factors) which arbitrators may or may not consider in
salary arbitration." 8 Players with more than six years of rendering their decisions.'33 This provision states:
service must acquire their team's consent prior to filing for
(A) The criteria will be the quality of the Player's
contribution to his Club during the past season
salary arbitration." 9 The agreement also permits certain
(including but not limited to his overall performance,
players, known as the super twos, with more than two years
special qualities of leadership and public appeal), the
but less than three years of service, to use salary arbitration
if they have "accumulated at least 86 days of service during
length and consistency of his career contribution, the
record of the Player's past compensation, comparative
the immediately prior season" and "ranks in the top
baseball salaries . .. , the existence of any physical or
seventeen
percent of the player[s] in the two year service
' 20
mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent
group. f
performance record of the Club including but not
The procedures for MLB salary arbitration
2
limited to its League standing and attendance as an
commences after the World Series.' ' The MLB Players
indication of public acceptance ....
Association (hereinafter MLBPA) and the owners' Player
(B) Evidence of the following shall not be admissible:
Relations Committee (hereinafter PRC) mutually select a
(i)The financial position of the Player and the Club;
panel of three arbitrators from a roster of approximately
(ii) Press comments, testimonials or similar material
twenty-four arbitrators provided by theAmerican Arbitration
Panel. 122The number of arbitrators, as a result of the collective
bearing on the performance of either the Player
or the Club, except that recognized annual Player
bargaining process, had changed from a single arbitrator to a
awards for playing excellence shall not be excluded;
panel of three arbitrators in 2000-2001. The bargaining
(iii) Offers made by either Player or Club prior to
compromise increasing the panel to three went in favor of
arbitration;
the clubs. A single arbitrator ischeaper,and therefore, favored
by the players. However, the clubs desired a panel of three
(iv) The cost to the parties of their representatives,
because of a lack of trust in a single arbitrator who may be
attorneys, etc.;
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(v) Salaries in other sports or occupations. 3 4
MLB has tailored this aspect of the collective
bargaining agreement to best serve its needs as a professional
sports league by omitting the possibility for consideration
of terms without the agreement and specifically predetermining what criteria the arbitrators may consider.
However, the agreement does not specify how much weight
an arbitrator must give to any of the provisions."'
Consequently, the parties instruct the arbitrators to allocate
"such weight to the evidence as shall appear appropriate
under the circumstances."'3 6 For example, the weight given

to the player's performance versus that of comparable
players' salaries is up to the arbitrators' discretion. This
may be problematic in that more discretion is given to the
arbitrator in determining how to weigh certain variables
and, therefore, may result in incongruous determinations.
Accordingly, salary arbitration provides the players with a
viable alternative to having the owners dictate their salaries
by assigning the decision to a neutral third party who will
7
objectively weigh the player's true market value.1

Prais

and

Crtiis

unique solution."'142 Therefore, an arbitrator in the
conventional arbitration context has more discretion in
deciding the outcome of a dispute. Parties to conventional
arbitration believe that the arbitrator will more probably
compromise between the two positions than go with one of
the parties' proposals. 43 This alleviates the extreme risk
incurred by FOA. That is,the arbitrator may choose the
other party's number, which often deviates from the first
party's offer by millions of dollars. Parties are less disposed
to good faith negotiations when they believe that a better
outcome may result from the arbitrator's decision, 144 and

they often undervalue the
risk of arbitration and the
probability that the
arbitrator will not
compromise. 4s Parties
to
conventional
arbitration regularly take
extreme positions during
arbitrations, believing that
their position may
influence the arbitrator's
decision
making
process. 146 Consequently, conventional arbitration alleviates
parties' fear of an outright loss and effectually undercuts the
motivation to bargain in good faith and propose realistic
offers prior to arbitration.

47

The inevitable risk in FOA is that the arbitrator can
pick between one of only two positions; this acts as a
"psychological, economic and political incentive" for parties
to negotiate in good faith and resolve the dispute on their
own.148 In effect, the risk of losing the arbitration neutralizes
the "chilling effect" created by conventional arbitration upon
parties' willingness to negotiate in good faith. 49 In the
context of labor disputes, arbitration acts as an instrument
for negotiated settlement and not as the primary tool for
settling salary' 0 disputes because of the high risk in letting
the arbitrator render a final decision, which may not be your
number.

FOA salary arbitration in MLB is a typical example
of interest arbitration.'38 Parties often settle the dispute
prior to arbitrator's decision because FOA restricts the ability
B. Final Offer Arbitration Fosters
of the arbitrator to compromise between the parties' final
Negotiation and Self Party
offers. In effect,"baseball's arbitration is a process designed
39
never to be used"'
The process consequently leads to a
Resolution
high-cost/high-risk situation for the parties if they do not
FOA encourages settlement by the parties for a
resolve the dispute themselves. 40 As a result, in comparison number of reasons. First, parties are motivated to settle
to conventional arbitration, FOA fosters negotiated because of the incentive to avoid the extreme risk associated
4
settlement by the parties prior to the arbitration hearing.
with FOA. I" Second, the parties rationally bargain in good
faith in order to resolve the dispute on their own, thereby
A. Fin;al Offer Arbitration v. Con'
engendering a presentation of their most reasonable position
ventional Arbitration
to the other party prior to the hearing. 5 2 Moreover, the
Conventional arbitration is a process where "a arbitrator's inability to compromise eradicates unreasonable
bargaining impasse is submitted to an arbitrator who selects negotiating positions.5 3 Third, as figures are proposed
either party's position on one or all of the pending issues, simultaneously by the parties, 114 they cannot evaluate the
compromises between the parties' positions or awards a opposing party's offer and thereafter propose a counter offer
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based on that evaluation.'
The fourth incentive to settle the dispute prior to
the hearing is based upon the distributive properties of salary
arbitration. FOA's reasonable final offers provide a midpoint
and a range of numbers to focus the negotiations when
numbers are the only issue. 6 Each side can judge how the
arbitrator will value the disputed item, which helps the parties
predict which offer the arbitrator will choose. 7 The offer
closest to the arbitrator's value is likely to win the arbitration,
and the parties then settle accordingly.'58 Prior to the FOA
hearing and the arbitrator's decision, the parties were aware
of the midpoint number and could effectively evaluate
whether the player was worth more or less than the
midpoint.'5 9 Consequently, this numbers game provided a
negotiable midpoint that promotes settlement. 60 If the
parties' positions were considerably different, the parties
had an economic incentive to settle.

6

'

Thus, in FOA, where

the discrepancy between the numbers is large, increasing
the risk of allowing the arbitrator render a decision, the
parties can focus on the midpoint number. This midpoint
number now becomes the negotiable number from which
the parties can better evaluate the strength of their positions
fostering party negotiation and settlement. On the other
hand, if the parties' proposals were close together, the
midpoint number may be an agreeable number,or the parties
6
could more easily compromise to find an amenable number. 1
The fifth motivation for the parties to settle the
on
dispute their own terms is predicated upon interest-based
incentives. One advantage of settling the dispute is to
circumvent the mutual costs of the arbitration process. In
addition, the parties can generate a mutually beneficial
settlement while including non-salary terms in the agreement.
In negotiation for settlement agreements, the parties can
fashion creative solutions for a win-win resolution to the
dispute. Players are more inclined to settle because they
can contract to secure benefits such as bonuses, no trade
clauses, guaranteed contracts, multi-year deals, or other more
imaginative clauses including single occupancy rooms on road
trips or initial payment of hotel charges rather than
reimbursement. 63 Furthermore, the prospect of a multiyear contract ensures job security, which is a very strong
motivation for players to avoid salary arbitration.'64
Clubs are motivated to settle for similar reasons. If
the parties do go to arbitration, the club will likely assume a
litigious and confrontational posture. 6 Clubs frequently
assert arguments criticizing the player's past record, physical
or mental defects, playing record, public appeal and his
contributions to the team. 66 This can only complicate the
relationship, whereas settlement may actually foster positive,
future relations between the two parties.1 67 The clubs could
very well be interested in signing a multi-year contract with
the player to ensure future services. 68 In contrast, if the
parties wait for the arbitrator's decision, the standard
contract following the arbitration is for only one year at

specified salary. 6 9 Accordingly, due to the risks involved in
allowing the arbitrator to render a final judgment, and the
other incentives to negotiate and settle, ninety percent of
baseball salary arbitration cases are settled prior to the
hearing itself. 70 As a principle purpose of FOA is to foster
negotiation and settlement prior to the final judgment, FOA
is indeed a successful process.

C. Criticisms of Final Offer

Arbitration in Major League
Baseball
One criticism of MLB's use of FOA is that it has
effectively led to significant increases in players' salaries even for mediocre players.' 7' The current system of salary
arbitration seems to unfairly favor the players because owners
are "obligated to participate if a player qualifies, have no
control over what they will pay their players, and [it] results
in budget-busting salaries.' 72 Hence, it would seem that the
owners are in a lose-lose situation.' 73 Even though its purpose
is to avoid strikes and lockouts, MLB's salary arbitration
system has become a major source of contention and discord
and sometimes results in both. However, prior to the
implementation of the salary arbitration system, MLB still
saw strikes and lockouts arising out of salary disputes. After
the implementation of salary arbitration, strikes and lockouts
concerned the terms of the salary arbitration system itself
rather than specific player salaries.' 74 For example,the players
went on strike in 1985 due to unresolved issues regarding
the salary cap and arbitration. 7 1 Moreover, in 1990, the
owners instituted a lockout over the same issues for thirty76
two days.
A second criticism of FOA, known as the "narcotic
effect:' is prevalent in any form of arbitration. 77 The narcotic
effect basically motivates parties who have previously relied
upon the system to use it exclusively to solve future disputes
and impasses. Research has determined that this
phenomenon is a customary result in FOA because parties
who have employed FOA make use of the system more
readily than those who use conventional arbitration. 78 It
can be argued that this is so because the process yields
positive results,thus, players who have experienced it choose
to invoke the process again, seeking to once again achieve a
negotiated settlement and increasing their salaries.
A third criticism is that FOA stimulates
gamesmanship; 79 that parties tend to concentrate on
predicting the mindset of the arbitrator instead of attempting
to resolve the dispute. 80 Salary arbitration becomes a"battle
ground of statistics,"'' where the party that can structure
the stronger line of reasoning, based on the numbers, wins
the case.'82 This argument is often tailored to appease the
arbitrator while detracting from the prospect of a negotiated
settlement. In addition, limiting the subject matter for
determination by a neutral third party to just salary may
restrict the prospect for settlement. 3

Major League Basebalk' Answer to Salary Disputes and the Strike
The criticisms of FOA can be attributed to other
variants within MLB, or are simply misdirected. MLB is a
business worth millions, even billions of dollars. To attribute
the increase in salaries solely to the implementation of salary
arbitration is simplistically misleading.'" Moreover, as the

next section will demonstrate, the narcotic effect in the
baseball context has actually led to an increasing amount
of negotiated settlement, and has had a receding effect on
the number of strikes and lockouts in the league.
Furthermore, even though gamesmanship may occur in
FOA, the evidence still suggests that the process is
successful and parties predominantly settle their disputes
rather than moving to arbitration.

FOA process, settle prior to the hearing more often than
other forms of arbitration. 96 Thus, by way of the narcotic
effect, the process results in the settlement of more
disputes.

97

Finally, even if FOA promotes gamesmanship by the
parties, the process nevertheless "encourages
reasonable final offers that facilitate
settlement."' 9 8 In MLB, players and clubs are
motivated to settle before the arbitration
hearing.'99 Moreover, the fact that it is simply
a numbers game provides the parties with a
more readily negotiable figure, once the
midpoint is determined in negotiations prior
to the FOA hearing."00 Taking both the praise
and criticism of FOA into consideration, the
current system employed by MLB truly works. The system
is an exceptional and superior dispute resolution process
that provides an expeditious alternative to litigation while
alleviating the costly,time-consuming, and bitter results that
often accompany other forms of arbitration.

D. Responses to Criticisms
Although FOA in MLB is one possible source of the
enormous increase in players' salaries, the clubs have won
236 out of 417 cases that have reached arbitration since
1974.1 The rise in player salaries can also been attributed
to inflation, increases in free agents, the enormous surplus
attained through multi-million dollar television contracts, the
profits returned from ticket sales, merchandise, and even
skyboxes. 86 Prior to salary arbitration, players' salaries were
artificially low under the reserve clause. 8 7 Moreover, in
contrast to the notion that salary arbitration is the cause of
salary inflation, "compensation for players eligible for salary
arbitration, however, has remained almost stable over the
past six years while free agent salaries have ballooned in the
competitive free market.'" 88 Accordingly, it is possible to
contend that FOA has effectively controlled salary inflation
where owners in the free market scenario could not.'8 9 The
statistics demonstrate that the current method of salary
arbitration in MLB has served its moderating purpose well. 90
There are no holdouts by those players who are eligible for
salary arbitration as opposed to players in other professional
sports.' 9' The cases are resolved expeditiously, and the
92
players all report to their spring training.
As previously noted, the narcotic effect is prevalent
in all forms of arbitration. 93 Although there is a discernible
narcotic effect in FOA, research demonstrates that FOA is
implemented a great deal more often than FOA hearings. 94
The implementation of FOA therefore facilitates negotiation
and settlement. 95 Parties may invoke the process more often
than the other forms of arbitration, but they also, in the

Historical conflicts in MLB throughout its history
mandate a system that can readily manage the over abundance
of disputes. FOA is the appropriate system for MLB salary
disputes because it fosters party negotiation and good faith
bargaining that frequently results in settlement rather than
actual arbitration.20 ' The purpose of FOA is to do just that,
and the process has done an extraordinary job in achieving
its objective2 0 2 More than eighty percent of cases filed for
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arbitration in MLB are settled before the hearing.
Conversely, even if the parties cannot settle prior to the
arbitration, the system affords an expeditious, informal and

final resolution for the parties.2 4 Chart A2 0 5 demonstrates

that FOA is a truly effective process for encouraging
negotiation and party settlement prior to the arbitration.
According to the statistics, players have filed well
over two thousand claims for salary arbitration, but only
four-hundred twelve of those cases actually entered the
process. Salary arbitration, therefore, is an effective process
that fosters party negotiation and, eventually, settlement.
On the other hand, even though the majority of cases
are settled before the actual hearing takes place, the average
rise in player salary has increased. Owners claim that FOA
is the primary and sole cause of the inflated salaries of MLB
players in the past thirty years.20 6 Salaries have indeed inflated
207
greatly since the inception of salary arbitration in MLB.
Yet salary arbitration has actually kept the players' salaries
in check. Chart B demonstrates that, between the years of
1991 and 1998, the average player salary has remained
relatively stable since 1993.
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CHART A: Historical Results of Salary Arbitration
Year
Team
Won
1974
1975
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Players

Settled before

Released

Filed

Arbitration

Before Case

Entered
Process

Player
Won

53
38
16
40
65
96
103
88
80
97
160
109
108
135
161
159
157
118
91
58
76

CHART B: Average Salary Figures for Players with three and four years of Major
League Service from 1991 to 1998
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Three-years major league service ($)
670,930
855,880
906,198
1,092,179
1,082,092
1,042,118
926,033
1,041,025

According to the above chart, player salaries have
not increased for those players with three and four years
of major league service since 1994. Thus, when examining
the entire scope of the financial framework of MLB, the
relative salaries have not increased as dramatically as critics
claim.20 8 The adverse affect of player salary inflation can be

attributed to other variables in MLB, such as inflation, free
agency, surplus from television contracts, increased ticket
sales, merchandizing, etc. 209 Moreover, owners do not have
to renew the contract of a player who files for salary
arbitration. 10° The owners have the ability to cut the player
instead of participating in arbitration that may lead to a higher
salary.2 ' If the owners feel that it is not worth it to participate
in salary arbitration, they can forego keeping the player on

Four-years major league service($)
1,194,205
1,275,992
1,667,404
1,539,654
1,999,746
1,609,511
1,666,583
1,601,351

the team. 2
Salary arbitration plays an essential role in the overall
machinery of MLB. The system affords a viable alternative
to litigation and more importantly to league strikes and
lockouts. The players are able to contest their salary disputes,
and the owners are able to maintain an operating
organization. Taken as a whole, FOA certainly manages to
keep MLB intact. Hundreds of cases are filed for arbitration
yearly, however,almost all of them settle prior to the hearing.
Given that MLB will continue to procure millions of dollars
in revenue annually, that free agents will compete on the
market, and that salary disputes will inevitably continue, MLB's
system of FOA is ultimately the most dependable and efficient
system to maintain stability in the league.
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See id.
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See Conti, supra note 13, at 231 ("In essence, the fear of 167 See id.at 390-91; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 62.
losing, which presumably encourages the parties to reach a
Meth, supra note 9,at 391.
settlement, is missing in conventional arbitration. Thus, the 168
6
1 9 Id.
limited risk in going to arbitration may undercut serious
negotiations between the parties and discourage the
exchange of realistic proposals prior to the arbitration 170 Id. Settlement is the purpose of FOA, thus the process is
succeeding.
hearing").
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Major League Baseball's Answer to Salary Disputes and the Strike
Major League Baseball at http://futures.wharton.upenn.edu/
-novose52/baseball.html (last visited April 28,2002) ("while
has 'so many overpaid millionaires' . . . the final-offer salary arbitration contributes to spiraling baseball player
arbitration system currently in effect ... has produced a salaries by consistently awarding players raises in salary,
system where the player, even if he loses, wins. Even when arbitration by itself is not responsible for increasing players'
an arbitrator selects the team's offer, the player receives a salaries").
significant raise."); see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 72
185 See infra Chart A; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 64
("Baseball management has criticized salary arbitration since
(noting that players have only won 181 cases in salary
its inception for inflating player salaries").
arbitration. In addition, only in 1980, 1981, 1989, 1990 and
"IJohn L.Fizel, Play Ball! BaseballArbitrationAfter 20Years,49 1996 did the players win more cases than the clubs).
171See

Chalpin, supra note 50, at 233-34 ("Salary arbitration
in baseball has been cited as the number one reason baseball

Disp. RESOL.J. 42, 47 (1994).

See Chalpin, supra note 50, at 235 (noting that if the
arbitrator was not bound to choose either one party's
proposal or the other party's position, then the owners would
not be in such a lose-lose situation).

See Novoseller, supra note 184, at 6.
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74 These disputes often concern the implementation of a
salary cap, the removal of salary arbitration,the limitation of
free agency, etc.
See Chalpin, supra note 50, at 235 n. 17 1.
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Note that the strike concerned the possible
implementation of a salary cap, something falling without
the scope of FOA, and the lockout concerned the Owner's
dislike for salary arbitration in general. However, contests
over actual salary disputes were not a reason for the strike
or lockout as FOA suitably dealt with such disputes. Id.
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See Conti, supra note 13, at 236.
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See infra Chart B; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 72.
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See Abrams, supra note 13, at 72.

190 See infra Section V for a discussion of the statistics
surrounding final offer arbitration in MLB.
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Abrams, supra note 13, at 72.
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See Meth, supra note 9,at 407 ("This phenomenon teaches
parties who have previously used arbitration to rely on it to
resolve future impasses and to refrain from resolving disputes
without it").
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'92 See id.
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See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.

See Meth, supra note 9, at 408. ("That those who use
FOA declare impasses much more often than arbitrators
implement awards demonstrates that FOA arbitrants use
the process to facilitate negotiations").
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See id.

197Id. ("Most cases settle between the date the arbitration
is initiated and the date the arbitrator's decision is expected;
only a small percentage are resolved by an arbitrator"); see
also MelanieAubut, When Negotiations Fail:AnAnalysis of Salary
Arbitration and Salary Cap Systems 10 SPORTS LAw.J. 189,224
(2003). "Regarding the salary arbitration procedure itself,
its conventional design did not have a 'chilling or narcotic
effect on salary negotiations: In effect, in 1991, 77 of 100
players who filed for salary arbitration settled their cases
prior to the hearing:' In 1999, 12 out of 36 filings went to
the hearing, while it was 13 out of 32 in 2000 and 17 out of
44 in 200 1. This demonstrates that, even though parties use
salary arbitration as a negotiation tool and even though some
cases get very close to the hearing itself, most cases are
settled without an arbitrator's involvement." Id.
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id.

Abrams, supra note 13, at 68.
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182 Id.

'83 For example, player interest in better hotel

accommodations, first class travel, flying out family members
to see away games, etc. See Meth, supra note 9,at 410 ("The
absence of non-economic factors that encourage settlement
might also contribute to a lower settlement rate outside of
the Baseball context").
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See Michael Novoseller, The Role of SalaryArbitrationin

SPORTS
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Meth, supra note 9, at 410.

199 Id. at 410 ("the lure of multi-year, guaranteed contracts
with bonuses and other perks is a strong incentive for many
players and clubs to forego the salary arbitration hearing");
see infra Part Ill, Section B; see also supra notes I12- 118.
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See supra Part Ill, Section B; see also supra notes 101 - 109

and accompanying text.
201

See Abrams, supra note 13, at 57, 61 ("Baseball's salary

arbitration is a process designed never to be used.... The
final offer design of the arbitration process insures that the
clubs and players will resolve most cases without the actual
involvement of the arbitrators").
202

Id. at 57 ("Although it has not been totally successful in

avoiding all hearings, salary arbitration has substantially
achieved its primary goal of private settlement").
203

See id; see also Novoseller, supra note 184, at 4 ("in 1996,

eighty-seven percent of players settled before arbitration,
with only 10 of 76 players who filed for arbitration requiring
their cases to be heard"); see also Conti, supra note 13, at
232 ("Since 1974, and up to and including 1996,2008 players
have filed for arbitration, yet 1608 (80%) settled before the
dispute ever resulted in a hearing").
204

See Abrams, supra note 13, at 57 ("If the parties cannot

settle their differences privately, baseball's salary arbitration
provides a quick, informal, and, most importantly, a final
resolution of the salary dispute.").
205

See Novoseller,supra note 184, at app. A; see alsoAbrams,

supra note 13, at 64.
206

See Conti, supra note 13, at 235 ("The reason behind the

owners' distaste for salary arbitration is their belief that the
practice inflates the level of salaries so that the wages paid
out to many players exceeds [sic] their true market value").
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See Chalpin, supra note 50, at 233-34 ("salary arbitration

in baseball has been cited as the number one reason baseball
has 'so many overpaid millionaires'); see also Novoseller,
supra note 184, at 7 and text accompanying note; Conti, supra
note 13, at 222 ("Owners of baseball teams have opposed
the system of salary arbitration for over twenty years, citing
the massive increases in salaries from such arbitration
awards....")
208

See Novoseller, supra note 184 (noting that free agency

and television contracts also owe to the increase in player
salaries); see also Conti, supra note 13, at 236 (discussing the
paradigm shift in negotiating power from the owners to

the players and the end of the reserve clause. "Whenever
there is a movement from such monopoly to a competitive
labor market, there is bound to be salary escalation....")
209

See Novoseller,supra note 184; see also infra Part Ill, Section

D, for a discussion of other variables adding to salary inflation.
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See Conti, supra note 13, at 237 ("The club is not required

to renew a player's contract once a player decides to file for
arbitration").
2I Id. ("While the club has the option to participate in the
process and thus retain the player for a one-year
commitment, the club also has the option to non-tender, or
refrain from offering a contract to that player")
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